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Abstract
We consider a two period model in which an incumbent political party chooses
the level of a current policy variable unilaterally, but faces competition from a po-
litical opponent in the future. Both parties care about voters’ payoffs, but they
have different beliefs about how policy choices will map into future economic out-
comes. We show that when the incumbent party can endogenously influence whether
learning occurs through its policy choices (policy experimentation), future political
competition gives it a new incentive to distort its policies – it manipulates them so
as to reduce uncertainty and disagreement in the future, thus avoiding the costs of
competitive elections with an opponent very different from itself. The model thus
demonstrates that all incumbents can find it optimal to ‘over experiment’, relative
to a counterfactual in which they are sure to be in power in both periods. We thus
identify an incentive for strategic policy manipulation that does not depend on self-
serving behavior by political parties, but rather stems from their differing beliefs
about the consequences of their actions.
∗Email: a.millner@lse.ac.uk, Tel: +44 7932 021256, Address: London School of Economics,
Houghton St., London, WC2A 2AE, UK. We are grateful for helpful comments from Scott Barrett, Bard
Harstad, Alessandro Tavoni, Rick van der Ploeg, Tim Willems, and seminar participants at Columbia,
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1 Introduction
Many of the most important public policy problems democratic countries face require
cumulative efforts by successive governments to be successfully managed. Consider envi-
ronmental policy (in particular regulation of stock pollutants such as greenhouse gases),
social security reform, sovereign debt management, and public infrastructure development.
None of these issues can be tackled in a single legislative term, and the total quantity of
resources devoted to them will likely be the result of decisions taken by several govern-
ments. As such, the policies incumbent political parties choose to address these issues are
heavily influenced by the incentives the political system provides for them to make sound
‘long-run’ policy decisions, even if the effects of those decisions may only be realized once
they have left office.
The lack of future political control that is characteristic of democratic systems means
that, for the purposes of setting ‘long-run’ policies, incumbents have incentives to manip-
ulate their current policy choices so as to influence both who gets elected in the future
and the policy choices future governments will make (Persson & Svensson, 1989; Aghion &
Bolton, 1990; Tabellini & Alesina, 1990; Milesi-Ferretti & Spolaore, 1994; Besley & Coate,
1998; Persson & Tabellini, 2000; Azzimonti, 2011). These strategic incentives exist even
if parties are not purely office seeking, but have interests that coincide with those of a
group of voters, e.g. in models of partisan politics. These effects have traditionally been
studied in models with heterogeneous preferences : parties are assumed to have intrinsically
different preference parameters, which induce heterogeneous preferences over policies, and
hence a strategic incentive for an incumbent party to manipulate present policy choices
given that its reelection is uncertain.
While heterogeneity in preference parameters undoubtedly accounts for some of the
divergences between political parties’ preferred policies, heterogeneity in beliefs is likely
to be an equally important factor. Milton Friedman famously argued that “differences
about economic policy among disinterested citizens derive predominantly from different
predictions about the economic consequences of taking action...rather than from funda-
mental differences in basic values” (Friedman, 1966). More recently, public surveys in the
US demonstrate a strong polarization in the beliefs of Democrats and Republicans about
2
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a variety of policy issues, including, for example, the likely causes and severity of climate
change (Leiserowitz et al., 2012; Borick & Rabe, 2012). Despite the empirical plausibility
of belief heterogeneity the consequences of relaxing the common prior assumption have
been largely unexplored in the political economy literature on strategic policy choice1.
The crucial new feature of political competition induced by heterogeneous beliefs is that
beliefs are dynamic, and potentially endogenous. Parties’ policy preferences may change
over time as their beliefs evolve in response to new information. Moreover this learning
process may, at least to some extent, be under the control of the incumbent, who may
choose policies with the express purpose of revealing information about their consequences
in the future; learning may be ‘active’. Active learning – the idea that current policy choices
influence how much is learned in the future – is an old concept in economics (e.g. Prescott,
1972; Grossman et al., 1977), which has been applied to problems in monetary policy
(Bertocchi & Spagat, 1993), environmental regulation (Kelly & Kolstad, 1999), and firm
behavior (Keller & Rady, 1999). It can be seen as a form of experimentation – we choose
an action, observe its consequences, and so learn something new about the relationship
between choices and outcomes. In addition, it is often the case that the more intensely we
pursue a policy, the more we can separate the ‘signal’ from the ‘noise’, and the more we
learn about its effects.2 Thus when learning is active, and parties have divergent beliefs
that they update rationally, the incumbent party has a measure of control over its own,
and its opponent’s, future policy preferences. This gives rise to strategic incentives for
policy manipulation that are entirely absent when parties merely have different preference
parameters.
Our core contribution is to elucidate the interaction between belief heterogeneity, active
learning (or experimentation), and political competition, and how this affects the size of
1Morris (1995) reviews the theoretical arguments for and against the common prior assumption. Ace-
moglu et al. (2008) demonstrate that Bayesian updating does not generically lead to agreement on pos-
teriors when agents are uncertain about the distribution of possible signals. Glaeser & Sunstein (2013)
and Fryer et al. (2013) consider alternative models of belief polarization, and Van den Steen (2004, 2010)
consider models of ‘rational’ overoptimism that results from heterogeneous beliefs. We will simply treat
belief heterogeneity as an empirical fact, and investigate its consequences for policy choice.
2Here are two examples: Consider a policy that decentralizes educational decision making (e.g. man-
agement and curriculum decisions) from a central ministry to individual schools. Our ability to discern
the causal effect of such a policy on e.g. test scores increases as more schools are included in the program.
Next consider a policy that aims to set the allowed level of emissions of a stock pollutant (e.g. greenhouse
gases). Suppose that the evolution equation for the stock of pollutant is parametrically uncertain, and
contains additive noise. The more of the pollutant we emit, the greater the level of the stock, and the more
our observations of the system depend on the underlying dynamics than on stochastic variation. Hence
our ability to learn the parameters of the system increases the more we emit (see e.g. Kelly & Kolstad
(1999)). Analogous reasoning holds for many public policies.
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public programs with uncertain deferred benefits (or costs). Since our concern is specifically
to understand how the interaction of these factors determines how incumbents respond
to the inter temporal tradeoff inherent in such problems, we abstract from questions of
taxation and redistribution, and consider a stylized model in which voters differ only in
their beliefs about the benefits of the policy, and parties that represent the beliefs of
groups of voters must decide only on the level of some policy variable. We show that the
interaction between active learning and political competition gives rise to a new incentive
for incumbents to distort their policy choices. This incentive pushes incumbents to choose
policies that increase their chances of resolving uncertainty in the future, regardless of
their beliefs: they will over experiment. The intuition behind this result is simple – since
the preferences of parties with different a priori beliefs converge when learning occurs,
incumbents avoid future costly competitive elections with an opponent very different from
themselves by choosing policies that reduce disagreement.
We demonstrate this mechanism in a two period model that combines the literature
on inter temporal decision making under uncertainty and learning (Arrow & Fisher, 1974;
Henry, 1974; Epstein, 1980; Gollier et al., 2000), with a simple but flexible model of political
competition (Wittman, 1973, 1983; Roemer, 2001). To demonstrate the effects cleanly, the
model assumes that parties care only about voters’ well-being, and disagree only in their
beliefs. Thus, in the absence of belief heterogeneity all parties in our model would agree
on the correct policy choice, which would also be the optimal policy for the voters. Yet
even in the sanguine case where parties are well intentioned and have common objectives,
heterogeneous beliefs and political competition will distort their policy choices. We show
that when learning is active enough, all incumbents will over-experiment relative to a
counterfactual in which they are sure to be in power in the future, regardless of their
beliefs and the beliefs of their political opponents.
Section 2 sets out the model structure. Section 3 examines how the interaction between
active learning and political competition affects policy choices when beliefs are heteroge-
neous, without specifying the detailed form of the political competition between parties.
To build intuition, a simple model with binary policy choices is discussed first, followed by
a more complex model with continuous policy choices. Section 4 specializes to a specific
model of political competition: the Wittman model. In our version of this model parties
know the distribution of voters’ beliefs, voters vote for their preferred platform, and elec-
tions are decided by majority rule. We show that our results hold under plausible primitive
conditions on parties’ payoff functions in this case, which apply in both ‘full commitment’
4
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and ‘no commitment’ versions of the model. We reflect on the application of our results
to a variety of policy issues in Section 5, before concluding.
Related literature
While the consequences of heterogeneous beliefs and strategic experimentation for the
policy choices of incumbents are (to the best of our knowledge) unexplored, several papers
investigate some of these factors in other contexts.
Piketty (1995) considers a model of social mobility and redistributive taxation, in which
agents hold different beliefs about the relative importance of effort and social class in
determining economic outcomes. The beliefs of different agents are updated based on their
income mobility experience, and transmitted to their descendants. Piketty shows that
belief heterogeneity persists in the steady state, and that experience of income mobility, and
not simply income level, contributes to forming political attitudes. While heterogeneous
beliefs are at the core of this work, it focusses on voters’ belief formation processes and their
interaction with demand for redistribution, and not on strategic policy experimentation by
incumbent governments.
Strulovici (2010) is explicitly concerned with strategic experimentation, but focusses
on strategic voters, rather than strategic parties. In his model pivotal voters recognize
that experimentation reduces their likelihood of being pivotal in the future – this results
in under-experimentation in equilibrium. We focus on the behavior of strategic parties,
who manipulate their current policies in part to influence the beliefs of future voters. In
contrast to Strulovici (2010), we show that parties who have good faith disagreements with
their political opponents have an incentive to over experiment.
Callander & Hummel (2013) consider a model that is in some respects close to ours.
They examine the efficiency of political turnover, when the only link between successive
governments is the information they possess. Incumbents can experiment strategically to
influence the information that their successors will use to make their policy choices. They
show that, due to the time inconsistency issues that are inherent in political systems with
turnover, experimentation can improve the efficiency of policies, as it creates a channel
for inter temporal influence. Their work focusses on the efficiency of political turnover as
a democratic institution – turnover is imposed exogenously in their model. Our work is
concerned with the effect of experimentation and belief heterogeneity on the policy choices
of incumbents, and not on turn-taking as an institution. As such, future office holders are
5
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determined endogenously in our model as the equilibrium of a political game, rather than
exogenously imposed. Thus incumbents in our model influence both who gets elected, and
the policies future governments will implement.
Finally, Hirsch (2013) considers a model of political organization in which a principal
and an agent disagree about which policy to implement, but share the same objectives,
and can engage in experimentation. Hirsch shows that it may be optimal for the principal
to defer to the agent to motivate him to act, or to demonstrate to the agent that his
beliefs are incorrect. While the fact that agents in his model differ only in their beliefs is
common to our analysis, the roles of the players are exogenously assigned in his work. His
model focusses on strategic delegation in a hierarchical organization, rather than strategic
interaction between political parties.
Despite the differences in context between our work and that of the last three papers
mentioned above, a common overarching theme unites them. In all these cases learning
provides a channel for influence, which is used to the advantage of a ‘first-mover’. In
Strulovici (2010) this is the pivotal voter, in Hirsch (2013) it is the principle, and in
Callander & Hummel (2013) and our own work, it is an incumbent government. Thus our
work contributes to a wider recent research program which sees information as a source of
strategic control in a variety of contexts.
2 The Model
We consider a two period model, and assume two political parties, indexed by i ∈ {G,B}.
The parties are well-intentioned: they care only about voters’ well-being, and don’t seek
office for their own ends. Our choice of labels for the parties is inspired by an environmental
interpretation of the model (‘G’ = Green, ‘B’ = Brown) which we will use to provide
intuition at several points in the exposition, but the model is applicable much more widely.
In the first period the incumbent party sets some policy variable e1, which gives rise to
certain first period payoffs U(e1). Second period payoffs W (e2|e1, λ) depend on the policy
e2 that is implemented in the second period, on the legacy of first period policy choices e1,
and on an a priori uncertain parameter λ, which affects the optimal second period policy.
The conditions we impose on U and W will be discussed below, for now we focus on the
model structure.
It may be helpful to keep in mind an example of a long run policy. Consider a case
in which e1 and e2 correspond to the levels of a binding cap on a stock pollutant, such as
6
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greenhouse gases, ozone, or sulphur dioxide. Then we might have
U(e1) = B(e1) (1)
W (e2|e1, λ) = B(e2)− λC(e1 + e2), (2)
where
B′ > 0, B′′ < 0, C ′ > 0, C ′′ > 0.
The function B(e) denotes known short-run benefits from industrial processes that emit
the pollutant, and C(e1 + e2) denotes long-run costs (e.g. health impacts or productivity
losses) incurred from the accumulation of the pollutant in the atmosphere. The magnitude
of these future costs is uncertain, and depends on the realization of λ.
Returning to our general model exposition, we assume that λ ∈ {λL, λH}, where λL <
λH . The crucial feature of our model is that parties have heterogeneous beliefs about
the consequences of policy choices. In the first period, party i believes that λ = λL
with prior probability qi. We assume without loss of generality that qG < qB. In our
environmental example, this implies that the Green party puts more subjective weight
on the ‘high damages’ state λ = λH than the Brown party – hence their labels. Each
party’s beliefs are assumed to be representative of the beliefs of some exogenously given
set of voters, i.e. the parties position themselves relative to some subset of the distribution
of beliefs in the voting population. The heterogeneity in the parties’ beliefs is the only
difference between them.
Party i’s expected utility in the second period, given beliefs qi, is:
A(e2|e1, qi) := qiW (e2|e1, λL) + (1− qi)W (e2|e1, λH), (3)
and we define
A∗(e1, q) := max
e2≥0
[qW (e2|e1, λL) + (1− q)W (e2|e1, λH)] (4)
e∗2(e1, q) := argmax [qW (e2|e1, λL) + (1− q)W (e2|e1, λH)] . (5)
A∗(e1, q) is thus the payoff a party with beliefs q expects to receive in the second period
if the value of λ remains unknown in the future, and it has exclusive control over which
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Similarly, if the value of λ is known for sure, both parties will agree that second period
payoffs are given by
W ∗(e1, λ) := max
e2≥0
W (e2|e1, λ). (6)
The parties are dogmatic, in that they do what they think is best for the voters given
their beliefs qi, and don’t account for the beliefs of those who disagree with them when
making their policy choices. They are however rational, and realize that in the future
new observations may be realized that provide information about the value of λ. They
will interpret this new evidence in a rational Bayesian fashion, and update their priors.
Moreover, each party knows that the other party will do the same. We compress this
incremental learning process into a single period.
To keep the learning process simple we assume that in the second period either the true
value of λ is revealed (with probability f(e1)), or nothing is learned about the value of λ
(with probability 1− f(e1))
3. Crucially, we allow the probability of learning to depend on
first period policies. If f ′(e1) > 0 then learning is active – the more intensive are first period
policies, the greater the chance of learning the value of λ in the second period. In this case,
policy experimentation carries an informational payoff. Alternatively, if f ′(e1) = 0, we say
that learning is passive: policy choices have no informational consequences.
Figure 1 illustrates the timing of events in the model. At the beginning of the first
period an incumbent chooses a policy e1. At the end of the first period either the true
value of λ is revealed (with probability f(e1)), or nothing is learned (with probability
1 − f(e1)). If λ is revealed, parties’ policy preferences are identical in the second period
– there is no difference between them as they hold the same beliefs. In this branch of the
decision tree there is a ‘trivial’ election in the second period – it doesn’t matter who gets
elected, as both parties will choose the same policy. If however λ is not revealed, parties’
beliefs remain divergent in the second period. In this case even though the parties have
common objectives, they offer different platforms, reflecting their different priors. Thus
each party announces a policy platform e2i at the beginning of the second period, and
voters decide between them in competitive elections.
We assume for the moment that parties commit to their announced platforms in the
3Note that this assumption does not violate Bayesian rationality. It is a simplification of the information
revelation process (akin to that in e.g. Arrow & Fisher (1974)), and not of agents’ responses to new
information. A model with partial learning would be significantly more complex (see e.g. Epstein, 1980),
and bring no new qualitative messages about the core interaction we wish to examine. All that we require
is that beliefs are ‘closer together’ after observation of a common signal, and that the incumbent can
influence the likelihood (or strength) of the signal being received endogenously.
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Figure 1: Timing of events in the model.
second period. The case of no commitment can be treated as a special case of this general
setup – we pursue this in Section 4.2 below. Since voters believe that parties commit,
parties will announce platforms that balance the (subjective) expected benefits of the
policy with its ‘electability’. Thus political competition induces parties to offer compromise
platforms. We model this electoral game using the Wittman model of political competition
(Wittman, 1973, 1983; Roemer, 2001). Under this model, party i’s problem is to maximize
its payoff P i(e2i, e2j|e1) with respect to e2i, taking e2j as given, where:
P i(e2i, e2j|e1) = π
i(e2i, e2j)A(e2i|e1, qi) + (1− π
i(e2i, e2j))A(e2j|e1, qi), (7)
and i 6= j ∈ {G,B}. The function πi(e2i, e2j) = 1− π
j(e2j, e2i) is the probability of party i
being elected when platforms e2i, e2j are announced. This function will be determined by
the distribution of beliefs about λ in the voting population, and a model of voter behavior
which maps each voter’s beliefs into a vote choice, given a pair of announced platforms.
In the interests of generality we leave the details of this function unspecified at this stage,
but consider a specific model in Section 4. It is clear from (7) that parties face a tradeoff
between increasing their chance of being elected (π) and having their policy enacted, and
choosing a policy that maximizes their expected payoff (A).
9
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Roemer (2001) finds conditions that ensure the existence of a pure strategy Nash equi-
librium to the political game with payoffs (7). These conditions will always be satisfied for
the specifications of π(e2i, e2j) we consider in Section 4 below, and uniqueness is guaranteed
as well for these models. We denote the value of the second period electoral game to party
i ∈ {G,B} by
Pˆ i(e1) := P
i(eˆ2i, eˆ2j|e1) (8)
where we use the ˆ symbol to denote optimized quantities that depend on the political
equilibrium. The equilibrium policies eˆ2i, eˆ2j will also depend on e1 in general. This
reflects the linkage between the two time periods due to the long run consequences of first
period decisions. Note that
Pˆ i(e1) ≤ A
∗(e1, qi). (9)
This follows from (7), which shows that Pˆ i(e1) is a convex combination of two terms, each
of which is less than or equal to A∗(e1, qi). Thus any incumbent party’s payoff is lower
when it faces political competition than when it is certain to be in power in the second
period. This is a consequence of the loss of control induced by competitive elections.
Summing up all the learning and political components of the model, the optimal first
period policy of an incumbent party i is
eˆ1i := argmaxe1≥0
[
U(e1) + f(e1) [qiW
∗(e1, λL) + (1− qi)W





where as before the ∗ symbol denotes an optimized quantity that is independent of political
competition.
3 Effect of political competition and active learning
on policy choice
Our main hypothesis is that the interaction between active learning and political compe-
tition gives rise to incentives for incumbents to ‘over experiment’ with their first period
policies. This reduces uncertainty and disagreement in the future, and hence avoids costly
political competition. In order to demonstrate this in our model, we need to examine the
additional effects of active learning, political competition, and their interaction, on policy
choice. Thus, we need to define baseline learning and political scenarios which we will
compare to the active learning/political competition scenarios.
10
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Table 1: Notation for our four policy scenarios
Passive learning Active learning
Individual Optimum e∗01 e
∗a
1
Political Competition eˆ01 eˆ
a
1
To this end, we define a passive learning scenario, in which first period policies have
no effect on the probability of learning the value of λ (i.e. f ′(e1) = 0), and an active
learning scenario, in which increasing e1 increases the chance of learning the value of λ
(i.e. f ′(e1) > 0):
Passive learning: f(e1) = f0, a constant. (11)
Active learning: f(e1) = f0 + fa(e1) (12)
where fa(0) = 0, f
′
a(e1) > 0, lime1→∞ fa(e1) ≤ 1 − f0. In the active learning case fa(e1)
represents the additional information that is revealed by enacting policy of intensity e1,
over and above the exogenous chance of resolving uncertainty f0. By comparing optimal
policies under active learning to optimal policies under passive learning, we will capture
the additional effect of the active component of learning fa(e1) on policy choice.
In order to isolate the effects of political competition on first period choices in these
two learning scenarios, we will contrast the optimal first period decision under political
competition with a baseline case in which the incumbent is guaranteed to be in power in
both periods – we refer to this as the individual optimum case. In this case, the optimal
first period policy of the incumbent i ∈ {G,B} is given by
e∗1i := argmaxe1≥0 [U(e1) + f(e1) [qiW
∗(e1, λL) + (1− qi)W
∗(e1, λH)] + (1− f(e1))A
∗(e1, qi)] .
(13)
The difference between (13) and (10) is that the value of the ‘no learning’ branch of the
decision tree is now given by A∗(e1, qi), rather than Pˆ
i(e1).
We have thus set up two dimensions of variation in our model – passive vs. active
learning, and political competition vs. the individual optimum. Evaluating the optimal
policies in (10) and (13) under the two learning scenarios (11) and (12) leads to four policy
scenarios. Table 1 summarizes our notation for the optimal first period policies in these
four cases.
The passive learning/individual optimum cases allow us to determine the additional
effects of active learning/political competition, relative to these baselines. The interaction
11
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between active learning and political competition is captured by looking for differences
between the effect of active learning (relative to passive learning) in the two different
political scenarios.
Comparing policies in the same column in Table 1 gives us the effect of political compe-
tition on the optimal policy choices of an incumbent. When learning is passive this effect
is captured by e∗01 − eˆ
0





comparing policies in the same row in Table 1 gives us the effect of active learning. This
effect is captured by e∗01 − e
∗a






3.1 A simple model with binary policy options
In order to build intuition, we consider a simple version of the above model in which first
period policies e1 can take only two values
4: e1 ∈ {0, 1}. The incumbent must either
implement a policy (e1 = 1), or do nothing (e1 = 0) in the first period. Second period
policies e2 may be discrete or continuous – all that we require is that optimal second period
policies e∗2(e1, q) depend on the value of q.
Our main result in this case is as follows:
Proposition 1. Active learning gives any incumbent party an additional incentive to ex-
periment (i.e. choose e1 = 1) relative to the passive learning case, in both the individual
optimum and political competition scenarios. However, this additional incentive is greater
under political competition than in the individual optimum.
Proof. Let Yˆi(e1) be the value of policy e1 under political competition, and Y
∗
i (e1) the
value of policy e1 in the individual optimum, for party i. Let f1 = f(1), and f(0) = f0,
where f1 > f0 when learning is active, and f1 = f0 when learning is passive.






where Ei denotes an expectation over λ ∈ {λL, λH} with probability distribution (qi, 1−qi).
The incumbent chooses e1 = 1 if and only if Yˆi(1)− Yˆi(0) > 0. We will refer to the quantity
4This simple case can be thought of as an adaptation of the classic model of Arrow & Fisher (1974),
which analyses the effect of learning and irreversibility on inter temporal choice, to our political context.
Note however that irreversibility plays no role in our analysis.
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Yˆi(1)− Yˆi(0) as the ‘relative benefits’ of e1 = 1. Define the difference between the relative
benefits of e1 = 1 under active and passive learning as:
∆ˆi := [Yˆi(1)− Yˆi(0)]f1>f0 − [Yˆi(1)− Yˆi(0)]f1=f0
= (f1 − f0)E
iW ∗(1, λ)− (f1 − f0)Pˆ
i(1)
≥ 0 (15)
∆ˆi measures the additional incentive to choose e1 = 1 (rather than e1 = 0) when learning
is active, over and above the incentive to choose e1 = 1 when learning is passive. The fact
that ∆ˆi ≥ 0 follows from
E
iW ∗(1, λ) = Eimax
e2
W (e2|1, λ) ≥ max
e2
E
iW (e2|1, λ) = A
∗(1, qi) ≥ Pˆ
i(1).
The first of these inequalities follows from the convexity of the ‘max’ function (information
has positive value), and the second from (9). Thus there is a greater incentive to choose
e1 = 1 when learning is active than when it is passive when the incumbent faces political
competition in the future.










= (f1 − f0)E
iW ∗(1, λ)− (f1 − f0)A
∗(1, qi)
≥ 0 (16)
Similarly, there is a greater incentive to choose e1 = 1 under active learning (relative to
passive learning) when the incumbent is certain to be in office in both periods.
Finally, we show that the interaction between active learning and political competition
gives rise to an additional incentive for the incumbent to choose e1 = 1, relative to the
individual optimum. This is demonstrated by the fact that the ‘difference in differences’
between the effects of active learning in the two political scenarios is:
∆ˆi −∆
∗






where again the inequality follows from (9). This inequality holds for any incumbent party,
regardless of its beliefs and the beliefs of its opponent.
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This result says that the difference between the incumbent’s incentive to choose e1 = 1
under active vs. passive learning is larger when it faces political competition than in its
individual optimum. There will thus be cases in which switching from passive to active
learning induces the incumbent to switch from e1 = 0 to e1 = 1 under political competition,
but not in the individual optimum. The converse, however, can never happen. If a switch
from passive to active learning causes the incumbent party to change from e1 = 0 to e1 = 1
in the individual optimum, it must also do so under political competition.
This simple result illustrates the incentive for the incumbent party to over experiment
when it faces political competition from an opponent who share its goals, but has differing
beliefs. While active learning provides an additional benefit (relative to passive learning)
to the e1 = 1 policy under both political scenarios, the difference between the relative
benefits of e1 = 1 under active and passive learning is greater under political competition
than in the individual optimum. This is so since, under active learning, the incumbent
party increases its chance of avoiding a costly election with an opponent different from
itself by choosing e1 = 1. It uses its first period policy choice strategically to reduce
disagreement in the second period. This result relies critically on the fact that the parties
have heterogeneous beliefs. Beliefs are endogenous and amenable to manipulation, whereas
preference parameters are not.
3.2 Continuous first period policies
The positive interaction between active learning and political competition is easily demon-
strated in the binary case examined in Section 3.1. We now extend these results to a
continuous model of policy choice. This turns out to be a more complex problem. When
first period policies e1 are continuous (and payoffs W are non-linear in e1), one needs to
rank optimal policies under different learning and political scenarios; we cannot simply rank
differences in payoffs themselves as in the binary policy case. This additional complexity
has long been recognized in the literature on the effect of learning on dynamic choice (e.g.
Epstein, 1980; Ulph & Ulph, 1997; Gollier et al., 2000; Ma¨ler & Fisher, 2005), which has
focussed on conditions that are sufficient to determine the direction of the change in the
optimal choice variable under different learning scenarios.
Following in this tradition, we will state sufficient conditions for an analogue of the
intuitive results obtained in the binary case to hold in a continuous model. There will
clearly be cases in which these conditions are not satisfied. In these cases the effects of
active learning and/or political competition on policy choice are ambiguous. The possibility
14
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of an ambiguous effect in the continuous model arises since comparing optimal first period
policies under different learning and political scenarios requires us to compare both the
levels of second period payoffs under different scenarios (as in the binary case), and the
derivatives of these payoffs with respect to e1. The results we obtained in the binary model
required us only to rank payoff levels under the different scenarios; in the continuous model
there are new effects to consider, as we explain below.
Reconsidering the models of the incumbent’s first period choices in (10) and (13), we
now assume that e1 is a continuous choice variable. Our sufficiency result is as follows:
Proposition 2. Suppose that first period payoffs U(e1) are concave in e1, and that unique
interior solutions to the first order conditions exist under all the scenarios in Table 1. If
















then for any incumbent i,
(a) Active learning increases e1 (relative to passive learning) in the individual optimum,







(b) Political competition either decreases e1 (relative to the individual optimum), or has













i(e1)) for all e1, qi, (20)
political competition increases e1 (relative to the individual optimum) under active
learning: eˆa1 > e
∗a
1 .
Proof. See Appendix A.
When the conditions of the proposition hold, active learning increases e1 (relative to
passive learning) in both political scenarios, but increases it more when the incumbent
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party faces political competition than when it is certain to remain in power5. The incentive
to experiment is thus stronger when the incumbent faces political competition.
To understand the conditions in the proposition, it is helpful to begin by examining a
special case. Suppose that W (e2|e1, λ) is independent of e1. In this case the only way e1
influences second period payoffs is through the effect it has on the probability of learning
f(e1); it does not directly affect parties’ payoffs in the second period. Thus the only linkage
between the periods is informational. In this case the conditions (18–19) are satisfied as
equalities as their constituent terms are all identically zero, and condition (20) is satisfied
for any strictly increasing f(e1), as its right hand side is zero. Thus the conclusions of the
proposition hold identically in this case (with political competition having no effect on e1
under passive learning in conclusion (b)).
The only information that is necessary to deduce the conclusions of the proposition in
this special case is the following set of inequalities, which always hold:
Pˆ i(e1) < A
∗(e1, qi) < qiW
∗(e1, λL) + (1− qi)W
∗(e1, λH) (21)
In words, second period payoffs under political competition when λ is unknown are always
less than payoffs in the individual optimum when λ is unknown, which are in turn always
less than payoffs when λ is known in the second period. These relationships imply the
pattern of effects we observed in the binary policy case (we used them in (15–17)), and
these effects carry over to the continuous policy case when information is the only linkage
between the two periods. The core insight is that in this special case our intuition for
how the interaction between active learning and political competition, which was based
on comparisons of the levels of payoffs under different scenarios, is undisturbed by the
derivatives of payoffs.
Now consider the more general empirically relevant case in which first period policies
affect second period payoffs directly. This introduces new terms into the first order condi-
tions, all of which depend on the derivatives of second period payoffs with respect to e1. If
we are to obtain similar results in this case we need these additional derivative terms not
to disturb the ranking of policies based on comparisons of the levels of the payoffs under
different learning/political scenarios, as in (21). Notice that we can combine the conditions
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∗(e1, λL) + (1− qi)W
∗(e1, λH)] (22)
Comparing these inequalities to those in (21), we see that the derivatives of second period
payoffs with respect to e1 must be ranked in the same way as the levels of the payoffs.
The conditions (18) and (19) are the crucial conditions of Proposition 2. When they
are satisfied, there always exist active learning functions fa(e1) such that (20) holds. In the
general case however, we need learning to be ‘active enough’ to offset the other derivative
terms that appear when comparing the individual optimum and political competition cases
under active learning. This is the origin of the condition (20), which requires the rate of
decrease of 1−f(e1) to be larger than the rate of increase of A(e1, qi)− Pˆ
i(e1) as a function
of e1. Put another way, it requires f(e1) to increase fast enough to offset the difference in
the marginal effect of a change in e1 between the two political scenarios. Formal details of
these arguments can be found in Appendix A.
While the message of the proposition is clear, the conditions (18–19) depend on en-
dogenous quantities, and it is thus not possible to know when they are satisfied without
putting more structure on the problem. This is a common feature of learning models (see
e.g. Epstein, 1980). In the next section we find primitive conditions on the payoff function
W (e1|e2, λ) that ensure that the crucial conditions (18–19) hold in two common models of
political competition.
4 Application to simple models of political competi-
tion
In this section we specialize to a specific model of voter behavior, which allows us to
determine the probability of election in (7). This framework leads to simple expressions for
equilibrium election platforms, which in turn allow us to write down an analytic expression
for Pˆ i(e1), the equilibrium value of the ‘no learning’ sub-game.
In the model we consider voters’ choices depend only on the platforms parties announce
(i.e. they don’t have a party affiliation), and the distribution of their beliefs is known to
both parties. We consider two variants of the model – a full commitment case, and a no
commitment case – and show that the same primitive conditions on the payoff function
W (e2|e1, λ) imply that the conditions of Proposition 2 are satisfied in both cases.
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4.1 A median voter model (full commitment)
In order to pin down the nature of the political competition parties face we have to specify
the probability of election function πi(e2i, e2j) in (7). In this variant of the model we assume
as before that voters believe that parties commit to any announced policy platform. Recall
that q denotes a subjective belief that the realized value of λ will be λL. We assume that
there is a distribution of voters with different values of q in the population, and denote the
cumulative distribution function for q by F (q). As before, parties’ beliefs are exogenously
given, and are assumed to be representative of the beliefs of different groups of voters6.
πi(e2i, e2j), the probability of party i winning the election when the announced platforms




1 if Γ(e2i, e2j) > 0.5
0.5 if Γ(e2i, e2j) = 0.5
0 if Γ(e2i, e2j) < 0.5
(23)
where
Γ(e2i, e2j) := F ({q : A(e2i|e1, q) > A(e2j|e1, q)}) (24)
is the measure of the set of voters who prefer policy e2i to policy e2j. Thus, each voter
simply chooses the party whose platform gives it a higher expected utility, and the election
is decided by majority rule.
With this specification for πi(e2i, e2j), the following lemma holds:
Lemma 1. Assume that W (e2|e1, λ) is a single-peaked function of e2. Let the median
voter’s beliefs be qm = F
−1(1/2), and assume that qG < qm < qB. Then the equilibrium
outcome of the political game in which parties’ payoffs are given by (7), and the probability
of election is given by (23), is that both parties propose the optimal policy of the median
voter, e∗2(e1, qm). Thus the value of the electoral game to party i is given by
Pˆ i(e1) = A(e
∗
2(e1, qm)|e1, qi). (25)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Thus when voters’ beliefs are known and they have single peaked preferences, parties’
6This does not imply that all voters a party aims to represent will vote for that party. Parties can
announce only one platform, and thus cannot ensure that all the voters it aims to represent will prefer
that platform to the other platform on offer.
18
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.50
platforms converge completely in the second period – they both offer the median voter’s
optimal policy7.
With this expression for the equilibrium value of the ‘no learning’ sub-game, we can
seek conditions on the payoff function W which ensure that (18–19) of Proposition 2 are
satisfied. The next result provides such conditions, without specifying a parametric form
for W .







Assume the following conditions on the second period welfare function W (e2|e1, λ):
W22 < 0 (26)
W21 < 0 (27)
W2λ < 0 (28)
(26) is the standard concavity condition, and in addition we assume that solutions
to the second period optimization problem are interior, so that the constraint e2 ≥ 0 is
not binding. This assumption simplifies our analysis, but our results are not crucially
dependent on it. It is readily shown (see Appendix C) that the conditions (27) and (28)
imply respectively that the optimal second period policy e∗2(e1, q), is decreasing in e1, and
increasing in q. In our environmental example this implies that the greater is the level of
first period emissions, the less parties want to emit in the second period, and similarly, the
greater the weight they put on the low damages state λL, the more they want to emit in
the second period.
Now define
ǫx|y := Elasticity of W2x with respect to y. (29)
Proposition 3. If U is concave, (26–28) hold, the probability of election π(e2i, e2j) is given
by (23), and
ǫ2|2 ≥ ǫ1|2 (30)
ǫ1|λ > ǫ2|λ (31)
7The median voter equilibrium is also the equilibrium that would result if parties maximized their
probability of election, and not their idiosyncratic expected payoffs as in (7). This was demonstrated in the
classic work of Downs (1957). However, although the equilibrium in the Wittman model with probability
of election given by (23) coincides with the Downsian equilibrium, parties’ valuations of the equilibrium
differ in our model, as shown in (25), whereas they coincide in the Downsian model. We consider a model
of political competition that also permits divergence between parties’ equilibrium platforms in Section 4.2.
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then both the conditions (18) and (19) of Proposition 2 hold.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The conditions on the elasticities ǫx|y in this proposition clearly require investigation.
To fix ideas however, it may be useful to see what they imply for the simple functional









B′′ < 0 (33)
respectively. The first condition requires the marginal costs of emissions C ′ to be more
concave than their marginal benefits B′. The second condition is satisfied by assumption.
Notice that both conditions are always satisfied in the textbook case of linear marginal
benefit and cost functions.
A core consequence of the elasticity conditions (30–31), which aids in their interpreta-





This is a Spence-Mirrlees sorting condition, which allows us to use beliefs q as an index
that tells us how much a change in e1 affects second period optimal policies e
∗
2(e1, q). Recall




< 0. Thus (34) says that the higher is q (i.e. the more weight
on λL), the less e
∗
2 is reduced when e1 is increased.
This property has important consequences for the condition (18), which gives rise to
conclusion (b) of Proposition 1: under passive learning any incumbent reduces e1 under
political competition relative to its individual optimum. This is really the novel condition
of the proposition, as the other condition (19), which guarantees that active learning causes
incumbents to increase e1 relative to passive learning, is well known; it can be seen as a
special case of the sufficient conditions for signing the effect of learning on policy choice
derived in Epstein (1980). Conclusion (b) is novel, so it is important to understand how
the properties of the payoff function in Proposition 3 give rise to it. This can be seen by
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2(e1, qm)] > 0. (36)
Now by the monotonicity of e∗2(e1, q) in q, we also know that
e∗2(e1, qm)− e
∗
2(e1, qG) > 0 (37)
e∗2(e1, qB)− e
∗
2(e1, qm) > 0 (38)
Thus from the inequalities (35–36) and (37–38), we see that if we increase e1, the distance
between the median voter’s optimum and either parties’ optimum increases. However,
reducing e1 brings the median voters’ optimum closer to both of the parties’ individual
optima. Since it is the median voters’ optimum that is implemented under political compe-
tition, and all parties have single peaked preferences over second period policies, all parties
want this policy to be as close to their individual optima as possible. Figure 2 illustrates
this intuition graphically. The condition (34) thus ensures that regardless of whether the
incumbent parties’ beliefs qi are greater or less than qm, it always has a strategic incentive
to reduce e1 relative to its individual optimum.
4.2 Exogenous election probabilities (no commitment)
In this section we replace the model of political competition in Section 4.1, in which the
probability of election πi(e2i, e2j) is determined endogenously, with a model in which π
i is an
exogenous parameter that is independent of parties’ platforms. It is readily seen that in this
case parties’ equilibrium platforms will coincide with their individually optimal policies.
Such a model arises naturally if parties cannot commit to their election platforms. This is
the case examined in models of strategic policy manipulation with heterogenous preference
parameters by Persson & Svensson (1989) and Aghion & Bolton (1990). In this case all
voters know that the parties will implement their individual optima after the election has
occurred, and thus the electoral outcome is determined by which individual optimum is
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Figure 2: Strategic interactions between the first period choices of an incumbent and the




> 0 implies that for any
δ > 0, the curves e∗2(e1 + δ, q), e
∗
2(e1, q) and e
∗
2(e1 − δ, q) as functions of q are ordered as
in the figure above. Increasing e1 relative to the individual optimum of the incumbent
party increases the difference between the second period optima of the median voter and
the incumbent, regardless of whether the incumbent’s q is above or below the median
value qm. However, decreasing e1 relative to the incumbent’s individual optimum brings
the median voter’s second period optimum closer to the incumbent’s, regardless of the
incumbent’s beliefs.




1 if A(e∗2(e1, qi)|e1, qm) > A(e
∗
2(e1, qj)|e1, qm)
0.5 if A(e∗2(e1, qi)|e1, qm) = A(e
∗
2(e1, qj)|e1, qm)




We can treat all these cases at once by allowing the probability of election to be an arbitrary
constant. We have the following proposition:
Proposition 4. Suppose that the conditions on U andW in Proposition 3 are satisfied. As-
sume that the outcome of the political process is exogenously determined, so that πi(e2i, e2j)
is an arbitrary constant in [0, 1]. Then the conclusions of Proposition 3 continue to hold.
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Proof. See Appendix D.
Thus the results in Section 4.1, in which the election outcome was endogenously deter-
mined by parties’ platforms and parties were assumed to commit, carry over to the case
in which election outcomes are exogenous (independent of parties’ platforms) and parties
cannot commit.
5 Real world applications
The mechanism we have identified can be applied in many policy contexts. Before we
discuss some examples however, we emphasize that we see the effect we have highlighted
as only a partial contributing factor to actual policy outcomes. Our purpose has been to
highlight an informational channel of inter temporal influence and its effects on the policy
choices of incumbents. The model is intentionally idealized, in order to crisply demonstrate
the new incentives for policy manipulation that belief heterogeneity gives rise to. Previous
literature (e.g. Persson & Svensson, 1989; Aghion & Bolton, 1990) examines strategic policy
choice when parties’ objectives are heterogeneous but they have common beliefs; our work
assumes the opposite. The real world, of course, falls between these two stark cases.
As a first example of the application of our mechanism, consider the case of public
smoking bans. The benefits of reducing second-hand smoke include lowering the risk of
lung cancer, reducing health care costs, and improving worker productivity. The costs
of bans are born by restaurants and bars who may see a decline in profits. These costs
are uncertain before the policy has been implemented. Indeed, the impacts of smoking
bans on the restaurant business are still debated (Hyland et al., 1999; Adams & Cotti,
2007). Given this uncertainty, and conflicting sources of information, different public
representatives are likely to hold different beliefs about the consequences of these laws.
Despite conflicting views, public officials have proven willing to experiment with smoking
bans, as their diffusion from a few cities and states (San Luis Obispo, California in 1990,
California in 1998, New York City in 2002) to many states and countries illustrates (Adams
& Cotti, 2007; Eriksen & Chaloupka, 2007).
Congestion charges provide another application. These taxes provide an immediate
social benefit by reducing traffic congestion and improving air quality in city centers.
However, they also impose a priori uncertain costs on residents who commute to the city
center by car, and hence on centrally located retail businesses. Despite disagreements
about the projected impacts of these policies, city administrations have rolled them out.
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The charges are usually introduced in an initial experimental phase, which enables affected
parties to learn about their consequences. This occurred in Stockholm in 2007, when the
charge was implemented for an initial seven month trial period, before being expanded and
made permanent (Winslott-Hiselius et al., 2009). Similarly, the London congestion charge
in 2003 was adopted after an 18-month public consultation period, which enabled affected
parties to learn about its consequences (Leape, 2006).
A further example is provided by policies that aim to regulate national emissions of
atmospheric pollutants. Policies that place an annual cap on emissions, such as the cap-
and-trade mechanisms of the US Acid Rain Program (established in 1990 to curtail sulpher
dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions), or the the European Emissions Trading Scheme
(established in 2005 to reduce greenhouse gas emissions), may reduce the future damages
that arise from the accumulation of pollutants. However, different actors hold different
beliefs about the magnitude of these damages, which are highly uncertain. Since forcing
the atmospheric system with emissions allows us to observe how it responds, emitting
more today helps to reduce uncertainty in the future (Kelly et al., 2005). Thus our model
suggests that even well-intentioned incumbents have an incentive to set less stringent caps
than they would prefer to, so as reduce uncertainty and disagreement in the future. Unlike
more conventional explanations of the difficulty of passing stringent abatement policies,
which appeal to partisan motives, collective action problems, and the influence of special
interest groups, this explanation does not require political parties to act solely in their
self-interest; it is simply a consequence of disagreements about matters of fact.
6 Conclusions
Our analysis has shown that when beliefs are the primary source of disagreement between
political parties, incumbents have a novel incentive to manipulate their policy choices. This
stems from the interaction between active learning – the ability to endogenously influence
future information revelation through current policy choices – and political competition.
When learning is active incumbents can control the degree of disagreement in the future.
Since the incumbent party avoids a costly election with an opponent very different from
itself if information is revealed and beliefs converge, it has an incentive to increase the
chances of resolving uncertainty in the future, regardless of its initial beliefs. This effect
relies crucially on the fact that, unlike intrinsic preference parameters, beliefs are endoge-
nous, and thus subject to manipulation.
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The mechanism we identify is widely applicable, and may have explanatory power for
any policy issue about which voters and parties have diverse beliefs, and where learning
occurs through policy implementation. Unlike conventional explanations of distortions to
public good provision due to the influence of politics, our result does not rely on rent-seeking
and the influence of special interest groups (Aidt & Dutta, 2007; Bohn, 2007; Battaglini
& Coate, 2008), or the institutional structure of government (Persson & Tabellini, 1999;
Lizzeri & Persico, 2001; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2001). It can be thought of as a parsimo-
nious causal mechanism that assumes the best of political actors, yet predicts that they
will still do more to reduce uncertainty than they would like to.
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A Proof of Proposition 2
To prove this result it will be useful to define two operators. For any functional Y (f) of
the probability of learning f(e1), define
ΓLY (f) := Y (f0)− Y (f0 + fa(e1)). (40)
This operator captures the change in Y when we move from passive learning (f(e1) = f0)
to active learning (f(e1) = f0 + fa(e1)) – the subscript L stands for ‘Learning’. Similarly,
for any functional Y (Pˆ i) that depends on the political equilibrium value function Pˆ i(e1),
define
ΓPY (Pˆ
i) := Y (A∗(e1, qi))− Y (Pˆ
i(e1)). (41)
This quantity represents the change in Y when we move from the individual optimum,
in which second period payoffs are given by A∗(e1, qi) when learning does not occur, to
political competition, where ‘no learning’ second period payoffs are given by Pˆ i(e1). The
subscript P stands for ‘Politics’.
The first order condition associated with the definition of eˆ1i in (10), which determines
the optimal policies under political competition, can be written as





















Similarly, the first order condition associated with the definition of e∗1i in (13), which
determines the optimal policies in the individual optimum, can be written as
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where
Φ∗i (e1) := f
′(e1)[A
∗(e1, qi)− qiW
















Now assume that solutions to the first order conditions for e1 in Table 1 exist and are
unique in all cases. Then for any function Φ,
ΓL(Φ) > (<)0 ∀e1 ⇒ ΓL(e1) < (>)0 (46)
Similarly, for any f ,
ΓP (Φ) > (<)0 ∀e1 ⇒ ΓP (e1) < (>)0 (47)
To see these relationships, note that when comparing any two solutions to the first
order conditions (42) or (44), the left hand side is always given by the same decreasing
function U ′(e1). Thus, assuming that unique solutions exist, if the sign of the difference in
the right hand sides, ΓL(Φ) or ΓP (Φ) as appropriate, is independent of e1, we are able to
infer the sign of the difference in optimal policies, as illustrated by Figure 3 in the case of
ΓP (Φ).
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Similarly, substitution from (45) and (43) shows that:




∗(e1, qi)/de1 − dPˆ
i(e1)/de1). (50)
From this expression, we see that:
Passive learning: sgn [ΓP (Φ)] = − sgn
[









dA∗(e1, qi)/de1 − dPˆ
i(e1)/de1
A∗(e1, qi)− Pˆ i(e1)
]
, (52)
where in the second line we have used the fact that A∗(e1, qi)− Pˆ
i(e1) is always positive.
The three conclusions of the lemma are now arrived at as follows:
(a) Consider ΓL(e
∗
1), the effect of active learning on e1 in the individual optimum, which










means that the second term in (49) is positive. It is also always true that
A∗(e1, q) < qW
∗(e1, λL) + (1− q)W
∗(e1, λH) (53)








Figure 3: Effect of a change in the right hand side of the first order conditions induced by
political competition on optimal first period policies.
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that is linear in (q, 1 − q), and is thus convex in this vector of probabilities (see e.g.
Gollier, 2001, p. 359). It follows that ΓL(Φ
∗(e1)) > 0, and hence ΓL(e
∗
1) < 0. Now
consider ΓL(eˆ1), the effect of active learning on e1 under political competition. This
is controlled by ΓL(Φˆ(e1)) in equation (48). We know that the first term in this
expression in positive since Pˆ i(e1) < A
∗(e1, qi) < qiW
∗(e1, λL) + (1 − qi)W
∗(e1, λH).
By assumption, dPˆ i(e1)/de1 < dA







second term in (48) is also negative. Hence ΓL(Φˆ(e1)) > 0, and ΓL(eˆ1) < 0.
(b) Consider ΓP (e
0
1), the effect of political competition on e1 under passive learning, which
is controlled by (51). The assumption dPˆ i(e1)/de1 < dA
∗(e1, qi)/de1 clearly implies
that ΓP (Φ) < 0 in this case, and hence ΓP (e
0
1) > 0.
(c) Consider ΓP (e
a
1), the effect of political competition on e1 under active learning, which
is controlled by (52). From (52), we see that ΓP (Φ) > 0, and hence ΓP (e
a
1) < 0,
provided that the right hand side of (52) is positive. This condition can be rearranged
to yield (20).
B Proof of Lemma 1
This result is an application of a theorem due to Roemer (2001). Recall that in the second
period, when no learning occurs, voters’ preferences are given by A(e2|e1, q), where e2 is
the policy variable, and q is the voters’ type, which is distributed according to F (q) in
the population. We assume that parties’ payoffs are given by (7), with the probability of
election π given by (23), and the parties’ values of q are in {qG, qB}.
Theorem (Roemer, 2001) Assume that:
1. Voter preferences are continuous in q and e2
2. Voter preferences are single peaked in e2 for all q.




4. (Monotonicity) For every pair of policies e2 and e
′
2 where e2 < e
′
2, there exists a
policy e′′2 such that the set of voters who prefer e2 to e
′
2 is equivalent to the set of
voters whose optimal policies are less than e′′2.
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5. Ψ(x), the set of voters with optimal policies less than x, is continuous and strictly
increasing
6. The median voter’s optimal policy falls between the optimal policies of the parties.
When conditions 1–6 are satisfied, the unique equilibrium of the game in which parties
payoffs are given by (7) and the probability of election π is given by (23) consists of both
parties playing e2m := e
∗
2(e1, qm), where qm satisfies F (qm) = 1/2.
We need to check that the conditions of this theorem are satisfied for our model. Con-
dition 1 is satisfied by assumption for our function A, and condition 2 follows from the
assumption (26), i.e. W22 < 0. This implies that A is concave in e2, and we have assumed
that an interior optimum exists, hence A is single peaked in e2. Condition 3 means that
the distribution function F (q) is continuous on [0, 1], the space of types, and is a mild tech-
nical restriction. Conditions 4-5 both rely on the following fact in our model: The optimal
policy e∗2(e1, q) is a monotonic (in fact increasing) function of q. We have guaranteed this
by assumption (i.e. the assumption W2λ < 0 ensures it). To show monotonicity (condition
4), consider two policies e2 and e
′
2, with e2 < e
′
2. A voter of type q prefers the former to
the latter iff:
A(e′2|e1, q) > A(e2|e1, q)
⇒ qW (e′2|e1, λL) + (1− q)W (e
′
2|e1, λH) > qW (e2|e1, λL) + (1− q)W (e2|e1, λH)
⇒ q < N(e2, e
′
2) (54)
where N is a number which depends on the two policies. Now since the optimal policy
function e∗2(q) is increasing in q, we can write the condition q < N equivalently as e
∗
2(q) <
e∗2(N). But this condition is exactly of the form required for monotonicity, i.e. we have
identified a policy e∗2(N) such that the set of voters who prefer e2 to e
′
2 is equivalent to
all those voters with optimal policies less than e∗2(N). Condition 5 follows from assuming
F (q) is continuous and that the optimal policies are monotonic in q. Finally, Condition 6
requires qG < qm < qB, surely a reasonable assumption. Thus our model fits the conditions
of the theorem, and the result is established.
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C Proof of Proposition 3






A∗(e1, qi) for all e1, qi (55)
By Lemma 1, we have that
Pˆ i(e1) = A(e
∗
2(e1, qm)|e1, qi), (56)






A∗(e1, qi) < 0 for all e1, qi. (57)

















dW (e∗2(e1, qi)|e1, λL)
de1
+ (1− qi)
dW (e∗2(e1, qi)|e1, λH)
de1
(59)
we can write the expression on the left hand side of (58) as
qi
[
































Notice that both the square brackets in this expression are of a similar form to (57). Thus
both conditions (57) and (58) will be satisfied if
Ω(q, q′)− Ω(q′, q′) < 0 for all q 6= q′. (62)
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This is equivalent to saying that Ω(q, q′), treated as a function of q, should have a global








= sgn(q′ − q). (64)
This sign condition ensures that Ω(q, q′) is a single peaked function of q, and that its
maximum is attained at q = q′.








As a preliminary step, note that by definition,
A2(e
∗
2(e1, q)|e1, q) = 0 (66)













By assumption (26), A22 < 0, and it is easily shown that assumptions (27) and (28) ensure
that
A21 < 0 (69)
A2q > 0 (70)
respectively. Hence the optimal policy e∗2(e1, q) is decreasing in e1 and increasing in q.
As a short hand, we will use the symbol A to refer to the function A(e∗2(e1, q)|e1, q),
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The factor in the round brackets in the first term is antisymmetric under the change of
variables q ↔ q′, and thus changes sign at q = q′. The second term is proportional to
A′2 which also changes sign at q = q
′. Thus the whole expression changes sign at q = q′
provided the coefficients that multiply the factors that are switching sign are of definite
(and the same) sign, and provided the two factors that switch sign have the same (and not
opposite) signs.
From (64), we want it to be the case that when q < q′, the whole expression in (75) is
positive. Consider the first term in (75) – we want this to be positive when q < q′. The
fact A2q > 0, so we need the factor inside the brackets to be positive for q < q
′, i.e.






















Now consider the second term in (75). A′2 > 0 when q < q
′ (this follows from A22 < 0,





We now look for conditions that ensure this is the case.
Recall that the optimal policy e∗2(e1, q) satisfies (66). Implicitly differentiating (66) with
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The second of these inequalities is identical to (78), while the first inequality is a new
condition.
For convenience, denote WL := W (e2|e1, λL),W




































where the last line follows after two or three lines of algebra. For this inequality to be
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Thus, we have shown that (88) and (89) are sufficient to ensure Ω(q, q′)−Ω(q′, q′) < 0 for
all q, q′. Simple manipulation of these two inequalities shows that they can be written in
terms of the elasticities ǫx|y in Proposition 3.
D Proof of Proposition 4
When political competition is exogenous, each parties’ equilibrium policy is to offer its own
individual optimum, so the value of the political game to party i is given by
Pˆ i(e1) = kiA(e
∗
2(e1, qi)|e1, qi) + (1− ki)A(e
∗
2(e1, qj)|e1, qi), (90)










(A(e∗2(e1, qi)|e1, qi)− A(e
∗
2(e1, qj)|e1, qi))
= (1− ki)(Ω(qi, qi)− Ω(qj, qi))
≥ 0 (91)
where the inequality follows from the proof of Proposition 3. Thus the condition (18) in
Lemma 2 continues to hold in this case, and we know from Proposition 3 that the conditions
(30–31) on W ensure that the condition (19) in Lemma 2 also holds. Thus the result is
established.
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